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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 980210-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

RODGER VANCLEAVE,
Defendant/Appellant.

.JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1..

Whether Vancleave knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to

counsel? This issue presents this Court with a question of law that is reviewed
"nondeferentially for correctness" with a "reasonable measure of discretion" afforded
the trial court when applying this legal question to a given set of facts. State v.
McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781 (Utah App. 1996). This issue was addressed in a pretrial letter and hearings and at trial (R. 38, 83-84, 360, 363 at 13-16).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case
Rodger VanCleave appeals from die judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable Lynn W. Davis, after a jury trial at which VanCleave was convicted of the
following criminal offenses: Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory, a first degree
felony; Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second degree
felony; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; Loaded Firearm in a
Motor Vehicle, a class B misdemeanor; and Speeding, a class C misdemeanor.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Rodger Vancleave was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on

or about March 17, 1997, with: Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory, a first degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4, 5; Possession of a Precursor, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4, 5;1 Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503; Possession of Marijuana in a drug-free zone, a class
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l); Loaded Firearm in a Motor Vehicle, a class B

lr

This charge was subsequently dismissed by Motion of the Utah County Attorney
because lab analysis revealed that the suspected substance was not ephedrine or any other
listed precursor chemical (R. 50-51).
2

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-505; and Speeding, a class
C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-46, 52 (R. 1-2).
On March 25, 1997, a search warrant was signed by the Honorable John C.
Backlund granting police permission to search the vehicle Vancleave was driving when
stopped (R. 5-8).
On April 21, 1997, a preliminary hearing wad conducted by the Honorable Guy
R. Burningham and Vancleave was bound-over on all charges and "not-guilty" pleas
were entered (R. 21-23).
On May 7, 1997, Vancleave, pro se, filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars (R.
39). On June 11, 1997, the UCPDA filed a similar request (R. 69-71). At a hearing
held on June 12, 1997, the State indicated that they filed a response to the request and
sent it to defense counsel (R. 360 at 10). However, at this time neither defense counsel
nor Vancleave had received a copy of the response (R. 360 at 10-11).
On May 9, 1997, Vancleave, pro se, filed a written demand for a jury trial and
for separate trials on each count of the information (R. 46). The trial court denied this
motion at the June 12, 1997, hearing (R. 360 at 28).
On June 11, 1997, Vancleave through the UCPDA filed a Motion to Suppress
evidence seized from Vancleave's vehicle at the time of his arrest under Article I, § 14
of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
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(R. 55-68). On July 1, 1997 (R. 361), a suppression hearing was held and Judge Davis
denied Vancleave's motion (R. 105-06, 114-20, 123-29).
On August 26-28, 1997. a jury trial was held with Judge Davis presiding (R.
193-202). After deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict of "guilty" on all charges
except the possession of marijuana charge (R. 191-92).
On November 10, 1997, Vancleave, pro se, filed a Motion for a New Trial (R.
227-34, 239-50, 251-59). At this time, Vancleave also filed a 402 motion (R. 235-38).
On November 10, 1997, Vancleave was sentenced to concurrent terms in the
Utah State Prison to run consecutive to the term he was currently serving (R. 268-70).
On December 30, 1997, a hearing on Vancleave's post-trial motions was held at
which time Judge Davis denied all motions (R. 320, 322-32).
On April 29, 1998, Vancleave filed a notice of appeal with the Fourth District
Court (R. 338-39). On or about August 11, 1998, the case was transferred from the
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 349).
Because the Sixth Amendment issue of counsel is of particular importance to this
appeal, Vancleave outlines the issue separately here:
1.

Representation

On May 7, 1997, Vancleave filed a letter with the trial court asking for the
appointment of new counsel because of a failure to communicate by the UCPDA (R. 38).
On June 12, 1997, a hearing was held where Vancleave again requested the appointment
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of new counsel (R. 83-84). At the hearing, Vancleave asserted that the Utah County
Public Defenders Association had rendered "insufficient assistance of counsel in this
matter," that he and the Public Defender (Steve Killpack) do not "see eye to eye", and
that he wanted counsel who was "willing to defend me in this case" (R. 360 at 6).
Vancleave further asserted that Killpack had failed to file motions on his behalf
and had failed to send him copies of motions and discovery requests (R. 360 at 7).
Judge Davis responded that Killpack "does not have to file motions in your behalf that he
believes may not be meritorious" and that Killpack was a "seasoned" attorney who had a
great deal of experience in criminal law (R. 360 at 7-8). However, the trial court
subsequently ordered defense counsel to provide Vancleave with a copy of the State's
response to the request for a Bill of Particulars when it was received (R. 360 at 11). In
addition, Killpack was ordered to provide Vancleave with copies of all written
responses filed by the State to all motions filed by Vancleave; and that Killpack and
Vancleave were to have consultation in respect to all received discovery (R. 360 at 15,
32).
Vancleave next asserted that there was a conflict of interest between himself and
Killpack (R. 360 at 8). Judge Davis then asked Vancleave about what his response
would be if new counsel believed that his requested motions were not meritorious and
Vancleave responded that he would "ask for different counsel" (R. 360 at 8). Judge
Davis then told Vancleave that appointed counsel was a "luxury" and that unless he can

5

"show an actual conflict of interest" then he did not get to select the attorney who would
represent him (R. 360 at 8).
Vancleave again asserted that an actual conflict of interest did exist (R. 360 at 9).
Vancleave argued that Killpack "doesn't do anything I ask him to do", that he had only
had contact with Killpack twice since the previous court hearing and that he could not
prepare a defense with such minimal contact (Id.).
After hearing argument from the State, Judge Davis denied Vancleave's request
for new counsel (R. 360 at 10). At the close of the hearing, Vancleave requests that the
trial court order that defense counsel have personal communication with him concerning
motions and proper responses (R. 360 at 33). Vancleave also requested that the trial
court provide him with "some subpoena forms" because his counsel refused (R. 360 at
38). The trial court ordered Killpack to provide Vancleave with the forms, however, the
trial court clarified that Killpack would "conduct the trial and make a determination, after
consulting with [Vancleave], which witnesses would be appropriate to call or how they
may present any evidence" or testimony (R. 360 at 38).
In the future Vancleave was ordered to seek leave of court to file any pro se
motions; and he was to send a copy of any such motions to the State and to Killpack or
indicate to the court that it was to make the copies and forward them (R. 360 at 43).
On August 26, 1997, at the commencement of the jury trial, the issue of
representation was again raised. The trial court reminded Vancleave that he was facing
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first degree felonies with complex issues and that accordingly he had required that
Vancleave file all motions through appointed counsel (R. 363 at 13). The trial court,
upon the urging of the State, then asked Vancleave:
whether or not you are representing yourself today with Steven Killpack as
advisory counsel, or whether he is the one that is going to conduct this trial
and represent you and be an advocate for you and speak in your behalf and
cross-examine witnesses in your behalf
(R. 363 at 14). The trial court then required that Vancleave make an election between
self-representation (with advisory counsel) and representation by Killpack (Id.).
In response to this issue, Vancleave inquired of the trial court whether selfrepresentation would affect any necessary appeal (R. 363 at 15). The trial court
responded that he "cannot advise you whether appellate issues would be favorable by
your personal representation or by your representation by counsel" (R. 363 at 15).
Vancleave then indicated to the trial court that he wanted to represent himself (R.
363 at 15). The trial court responded to this request as follows:
Very well. If you choose to represent yourself, you will represent
yourself. You will be the only spokesman for the defense. Mr. Killpack
will not have the opportunity then to cross examine witnesses. He will not
have the ability to call witnesses. He will not have the ability to make
opening statements or closing arguments to the jury. But I will give you

7

leave, during the course of the trial, when necessary, to consult with him on
procedural matters and for clarification of matters and for the exhaustion of
questions and cross-examination of witnesses. He will be advisory and a
consultant to you, and you may proceed to represent yourself.
I don't recommend that. I've told you at all stages of this case that
these are serious charges, and that I think your case is best served by having
a seasoned expert, a seasoned advocate, a seasoned attorney such as Mr.
Killpack to be your advocate in this case. That has been my
recommendation at all stages. I don't depart from it now. But you have the
right to represent yourself. And to that extent you may elect to do so, but
under the conditions that I have stated
(R. 363 at 15-16). Vancleave then responded "okay" and proceeded to represent himself
with Killpack acting as advisory counsel (R. 363 at 16). The trial court frequently
encouraged Vancleave to have Killpack represent him.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Testimony of Deputy David Knowles
David Knowles, a detective with the Utah County Sheriffs Department,

testified that on March 7, 1997, he was patrolling in the area of Spanish Fork
Canyon where the posted speed limit is 65 miles per hour (R. 363 at 81-82, 85-86).
8

While patrolling; knowles ubsened i\ white Buick headed westbound down the
canyon

>ff that he believed was speeding (R. 363 at 87-

8«

bllowed the vehicle in order to get a paced reading of speed before

initiating a stop of the vehicle for traveling 75 miles per hour (R. 363 at 88-89).
After the vehicle stopped—exactly 446 feet from the Covered Bridge
parking lot (R. 363 at 190-92), Knowles approached L^ vii*, ci, who was identihocl
as Rodger Vancleave from a V •» Mexico dn

* .*

Knowles testified that;
passenger t

^

ui 01, " i i).
i1 i r 11? t I'rifTi the

.
> check on Vancleave, Knowles arrested Vancleave

twu warrants and discovered from Vancleave that there was a firearm
underneath the front seat of the vehicle (R. 363 at 94, 121) Knowles checked the
vehicle and found an operable handgun that was fully loaded ( R U»3 a! * H) K)"'),
Knowles also found a small, burnt marijuana cigarette under the seal, > > nht
ammunition and a broken \ lal on the l | . , m
seat (R , 31> J 11 I'"11 11l ]l I

l1,

and

MHDC

/jjj-Aig paper, <n. flu ti ml

11 J " * * I e:, 11M I f I *! t M I ( ! ) • 11 i • i'" • ! 4 r 11ie one found broken in
c methamphetamine (R. 363 at 104).

< -ivch of the vehicle's trunk, Knowles located duffle bags shown
in a photograph of the trunk which was admitted as State's Exhibit #14 (R. 363 at
9

107). In the black duffel bag with the blue zipper (Exhibit #15), Knowles testified
that he observed some beakers, a funnel and a black stopper tube or plug, a
thermos and ajar containing clear liquid (R. 363 at 107). Knowles testified that
these items caused him concern because these items were consistent with the
manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 363 at 108). In the other bag (Exhibit #16),
Knowles testified that he observed a can of acetone and other glass items (R. 363
at 108). In a third bag (Exhibit #17), Knowles testified that he observed rubber
gloves, a partially-visible vacuum pump and some tubing—all items, which
according to Knowles, are commonly found in association with a
methamphetamine lab (R. 363 at 110). It is unclear from Knowles' testimony as to
which bags were partially opened in the trunk when he first observed them and
which bags he opened in his exploration (R. 364 at 59-). Knowles testified that he
also found a box containing books, letters and papers in the trunk (Exhibit #18).
Knowles testified that he was concerned that there might be "dangerous
chemicals" in the bags so he contacted Richard Case, a lab certified detective (R.
363 at 112).
During the search of the vehicle, Vancleave was seated in Knowles' patrol
car (R. 363 at 113). Afterwards Knowles testified that he read Vancleave his
Miranda rights and then questioned him about the methamphetamine lab (R. 363 at
10
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Knowles testified that Vancleave informed him that he had used

methamphetamine before he left on his trip and that he was transporting the lab to
Ogden in exchange for $105000 (R. 363 at 114,.
Vancleave was later transported to the Utah County Jail and the vehicle was
driven to a vehicle storage facility at the old jail (R. 363 at 114). Knowles testified
that he turned all items of e vidence over to Sergeant Case when he assumed his
duties as case ofi
i

,:
'

anil pint n l i m "

(i111

!- •

'

i-

n 'in*1 h l V *

•'

.

-

x

i-

!

and
:

-

.\' PI ^envd

photographs of the bags (R. 364 at 57).
B.

Testimony of Deputy Richard Case
Richard Case of the Utah County Sheriffs Department testified that he has

been certified by the D E A in regards to clandestine laboratories (R. 364 at 110
11) During this certification process, Case was taught 1 IOVV to identify,
disassemble and des f:i o> si icll: m labs (R 364 at 111) Case also testified that the
DhA has | HI oil in 111} MI li ill i'(H i i.il polit Irs and proi nJluics as to I he Imiitlliiijj" oil lah
evidence (R. 364 at I 12). When a discovery of a possible lab is made, Case
testified that he has been instructed to contact the State Lab Team from the Utah
Department of Investigations in order that certified personnel can respond to the

site to disassemble and destroy the lab (R. 364 at 112). Case testified that the lab
evidence is viewed and then destroyed because of "environmental hazards that the
items pose in themselves, along with the chemicals associated with the
manufacturing of illicit street drugs" (R. 364 at 113, 364 at 145-48).
Case testified that on March 7, 1997, he responded to the Utah County Jail
to an investigation regarding Vancleave (R. 364 at 113-14). Case testified that
immediately upon meeting Knowles at the the jail he recovered "all of the items
from the lab—the vehicle" and that later in the evening he picked up other itemssuch as the gun and holster—from Knowles' residence (R. 364 at 114-15).
Later Case searched the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant (R. 364 at
118). At trial, Case identified Exhibits 15-17 as photographs of the bags that were
turned over to him by Knowles and which had been in his vehicle (R. 364 at 119,
128). Case further indicated that the items in the bags were destroyed at the Utah
County Jail parking lot by the clandestine drug lab team (R. 364 at 134). Case
also testified that Exhibit 21 was the original evidence receipt and property report
that was provided by the State Lab Team when they disposed of "the lab" (R. 364
at 119). Case testified that he was present when the document was prepared and
that he observed as each of the items listed on the report was located from the
evidence—from the bags pictured in Exhibits 15-17 (R. 364 at 120). Case testified
12

thai based on 1 lis experience, he observed items in the bag that could or would be
used to manufacture methamphetamine (R. 364 at 120). Case, likewise, testified
that those items were destroyed (R. 364 at 120).
Case testified that he spoke with Vancleave at the jail while he was seated in
the passenger seat of Deputy Buffon's patrol vehicle 11<

^ .u

Case, Vancleave told him that his fingerprints
items, thai lit h<ul UTII MI1 ilsrd IIMI ,i "iiiniulh »:o

. . \ccording to
^

.

<;;

I

•• ^

iiiiii! in nlhs} I'lii'i f« In1. .iiMi,ill .mil Ihiil he was Irair (XIIUIIJ1 (he labfrom,,Texas to
Ogden(R. 364 at 122-124).
C.

Testimony of Sergeant Denton Johnson
Denton Johnson, a sergeant with the Orem Police Department, testified that,

pursuant to a search warrant, he performed a search of V ancleave's car at the
Pleasant Grove Police Department (R , 364 at 15 7 58), Durii ig the search, Johnson

and a "recipe" in the visor above the driver's seat (Exhibit 27) (R. 364 at 164,
191).

13

D.

Testimony of Jennifer McNair
Jennifer McNair, an analyst of suspected controlled substances at the Utah

State Crime Laboratory, testified that she was familiar with equipment and
supplies—including recipes—used in the production of methamphetamine (R. 364
at 188). McNair testified that she has responded to the scene of approximately 40
clandestine methamphetamine labs (R. 364 at 188). McNair testified that she
examined the recipe found with the correspondence addressed to Vancleave
(Exhibit 27) and found it to be "very similar to a recipe I've used in the laboratory
to produce methamphetamine" (R. 364 at 191-92).
McNair also testified that Exhibit 21 is an evidence property report used by
the Utah Department of Investigations at clandestine laboratory scenes (R. 364 at
192). McNair testified that all equipment connected with suspected clandestine
laboratory sites are considered by policy to be hazardous, per se, and are therefore,
by policy, destroyed as soon as they are identified and noted (R. 364 at 193).
McNair testified that she examined the list (Exhibit 21)2 and that it includes
equipment which would be or could be used in the production of

2

During trial, the State and Vancleave stipulated that Vancleave's fingerprints would
not have been found on any of the items located in the bags in the trunk of the vehicle
driven by Vancleave and identified and listed in Exhibit 21 (R. 364 at 210).
14

methamphetamine and that the items inventoried there are consistent with what
could be found at a methamphetamine lab site (R. 364 at 193).
McNair testified that the three main chemicals used for the manufacture of
methamphetamine are ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, iodine and red phosphorous (R.
:

.i

..... . . .

; nethamphetamine .i.w is most widely

McNair ulso analyzed the ni^pn ii*d i?iai ipun

I I'IIMIVIIC

(l'\hiln| Hi) m I

that it tested positive (R. 364 at 189-91). In addition to the cigarette, McNair
tested a powder substance from which no controlled substances were identified (R.
364 at 198-99) The substance was identified as "4-methyl-amino-phenor--a
sumstance that McNair was unsure of whether it was hazardous or explosive (R.
364 at.
E.

1

ckbader

Mar; 'Bun I binlcr scr^rani nl'io »nK IIIHI iMi'inifiratinn lm lln1 Drpailmrnl
of Corrections, testified that she brought exhibits 19-20 to tl le trial coi n I:fion i tl le
ETepartment of Corrections (R. 363 at 139-42). She also testified that she received

3

tc

The State also stipulated that had all of the items seized from the vehicle been
none of them would have tested positive for red phosphorous CR ^d 949^

a demand for a 120-day disposition from Vancleave and that she is the authorized
records authority at the Utah State Prison (R. 363 at 144).
Brockbader further testified that on March 7, 1997, Vancleave was on
parole in the State of Utah (R. 364 at 90). In addition, Brockbader testified that on
one release date Vancleave was released to the State of New Mexico but that she
could find nothing in his file which refers to a "compact" to New Mexico (R. 364
at 95).
F.

Testimony of Rodger Vancleave
Vancleave testified that the vehicle he was driving at the time of his arrested

did not belong to him but was borrowed from a fellow New Mexico resident who
had been staying at his residence in Alamogordo (R. 364 at 265-66). Vancleave
testified that he did not have knowledge of what was inside the bags which were in
the vehicle when he borrowed the vehicle (R. 364 at 266). Vancleave also
testified that he did not know that there was a firearm in the vehicle until shortly
before his arrest (R. 364 at 267). In addition, Vancleave testified that he was no
longer on parole in New Mexico because it had been terminated (R. 364 at 267,
271). Finally, Vancleave testified that he did not have any intent to manufacture
any type of controlled substance (R. 364 at 268); and he denied ever admitting to
the police that he was transporting lab equipment to Ogden (R. 364 at 281).
16

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant the i IL:III

IM

l»c: represents. . counsel and the right to self-representation if a

knowing, voluntary and intelligent waivn ir1-' niiidi o( Ihr iiHil il i mnisH

hii

SIIIII Hi

,„i

waiver to be constitutionally permissible, the trial court must assure that the defendant
understands the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"

In accordance with

tli Is dut> I Jtah appellate ecu 11 ts ha \ e i nsti i icted ti ial coi n ts to engage in an on the
record colloquy in order to ascertain the validity of ihr waiver nl

COIM^I

il ^ i (hi

MI

\

least it must be apparent from the trial court record that the defendant understood the
seriousness of the charges against him, knew the maximum penalty, and had an actual
awai eness of the • i isl ;:s of pi oceeding pi o s s V anclea v e assei ts that the trial court did
not act in accordance with his duty to ensure that any waivei oi he D

S

in line with the requirements of Utah courts and the constitution. The trial court did
not engage in a sufficient colloquy with Vancleave

The trial court did not ensure that

maximum penalty he could face if convicted. In addition, the trial court did not assure
that Vancleave had an actual awareness of the risks of self-representation.
Accordingly, V ancleave requests that this Court reverse his conviction because his
waivn nl tin II1 hi 1 MHiiisrl

M,!)11

not knn'uiii'l 1

uliinliii il nil iniclliiu'iillv mi.mill

ARGUMENT
POINT I
VANCLEAVE'S WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT MADE
KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY OR INTELLIGENTLY
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
criminally accused the right to competent legal counsel and the right to selfrepresentation. McDonald, 922 P.2d at 778-79 (citations omitted). However, for a
defendant to constitutionally represent himself, he must knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily "forgo the benefits" associated with the right to counsel. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-33, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540 (1975); State v. Frampton, 137
P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987); McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779.
Moreover, while Vancleave has "the burden of showing by a preponderance of
evidence that he did not so waive this right", the trial court has the "duty to determine
whether a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent."
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 1 22-23, 979 P.2d 799, 810. Accordingly, Utah courts
have repeatedly recommended that the trial court conduct an on-the-record colloquy
with the accused in which "the court should fully inform the accused 'of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows
what he is doing and that his choice is made with eyes open.'" Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at
f 23, 922 P.2d at 810 (quoting and citing Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187). In addition, the
trial court "should also carefully evaluate the accused's background, experience, and
18

conduct insofar as they indicate what the accused understands in attempting to waive
the right to counsel. Bakalov 1999 UT 45 at 1 23.
As a guide to the trial courts, the Utah Supreme Court in Frampton cited, in its
entirety, the colloquy set forth in the Bench Book for United States District Court
Judges to be utilized when a defendant states a desire to represent himself. 737 P.2d at
187, n. 12. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court in Frampton stated that such "a colloquy
on the record between the court and the accused is the preferred method of ascertaining
the validity of a waiver because it insures that defendants understand the risks of selfrepresentation." 922 P.2d at 187.
In this case, the trial court did not engage in such a colloquy with Vancleave.
Although the issue of Vancleave's dissatisfaction with appointed counsel had been
addressed prior to trial (R. 38, 83-84, 360), the question of self-representation did not
become at issue until the morning of trial. On the morning of trial, the issue of
Vancleave's request for a 120-day disposition was again raised and Vancleave spoke
spoke of motions and a form that he had prepared and sent to the court and the State
(R. 363 at 9, 13). During this discussion, the trial court reminded Vancleave that he
was to file all motions through his counsel in order to avoid confusion because first
degree felonies are involved (R. 363 at 13). The State then suggested that the trial
court address the issue of representation and the following discussion ensued:
The trial court asked Vancleave:

19

whether or not you are representing yourself today with Steven Killpack
as advisory counsel, or whether he is the one that is going to conduct this
trial and represent you and be an advocate for you and speak in your
behalf and cross-examine witnesses in your behalf
(R. 363 at 14). The trial court then required that Vancleave make an election between
self-representation (with advisory counsel) and representation by Killpack (Id.).
In response to this issue, Vancleave inquired of the trial court whether selfrepresentation would affect any appellate litigation that might prove necessary should
he be convicted (R. 363 at 15). The trial court responded that he could not "advise
[Vancleave] whether appellate issues would be favorable by [his] personal
representation or by [his] representation by counsel" (R. 363 at 15).
Vancleave then indicated to the trial court that he wanted to represent himself
(R. 363 at 15). The trial court responded to this request as follows:
Very well. If you choose to represent yourself, you will represent
yourself. You will be the only spokesman for the defense. Mr. Killpack
will not have the opportunity then to cross examine witnesses. He will
not have the ability to call witnesses. He will not have the ability to make
opening statements or closing arguments to the jury. But I will give you
leave, during the course of the trial, when necessary, to consult with him
on procedural matters and for clarification of matters and for the
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exhaustion of questions and cross-examination of witnesses. He will be
advisory and a consultant to you, and you may proceed to represent
yourself.
I don't recommend that. I've told you at all stages of this case that
these are serious charges, and that I think your case is best served by
having a seasoned expert, a seasoned advocate, a seasoned attorney such
as Mr. Killpack to be your advocate in this case. That has been my
recommendation at all stages. I don't depart from it now. But you have
the right to represent yourself. And to that extent you may elect to do so,
but under the conditions that I have stated
(R. 363 at 15-16). Vancleave then responded "okay" (R. 363 at 16) and proceeded to
represent himself with Killpack acting as advisory counsel.
Although the trial court during the course of the trial encouraged Vancleave to
allow Killpack to represent him and imparted to him the wisdom of such a decision, the
trial court never engaged in a colloquy on the record with Vancleave that is similar to
that set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Frampton. For example, the trial court did
not ascertain whether Vancleave had studied law in the past or represented himself in
any other criminal action. The trial court did not enquire whether Vancleave was
familiar with the Rules of Evidence or Criminal Procedure. In addition, the trial court
did not set forth the crimes of which Vancleave was charged (although he did allude to
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first degree felonies) nor did the trial court set forth the potential penalties that could
result from conviction. Finally, the trial court did not inquire as to the voluntariness of
Vancleave's decision. See, Frampton, 131 P.2d at n.12. Cf.9 Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at
1 23-26 (Trial court attempted several times to engage in Frampton colloquy with
defendant before finally engaging in successful colloquy; McDonald, 922 P.2d at 782
(Court inquired of defendant number of trials he had been involved in, whether he had
knowledge of rules of evidence, what education he had, and whether he understood the
seriousness of the charges).
While the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the failure to conduct such a
colloquy would not warrant automatic reversal and that the Court would "look at any
evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of
proceeding pro se," the Court also stated that "[i]n the absence of a colloquy, the
record must somehow otherwise show that the defendant understood the seriousness of
the charges and knew the possible maximum penalty." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188.
Vancleave asserts that the trial court failed to inform him of the possible maximum
penalty during their discussion on the issue of self-representation. Moreover, other
than a vague reference to "first degree felonies" the trial court did not impart the
seriousness of the charges to Vancleave.
Finally, Vancleave asserts that he was not advised by the trial court of the
"actual risks of proceeding pro se." In fact, Vancleave sought to ascertain these actual
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risks of self-representation when he inquired as to what affect self-representation would
have on his ability to appeal any conviction (R. 363 at 15). However, instead of
educating Vancleave on the appellate rules concerning adequate preservation of issues
and the effect thai ignorance of the law and rules of procedure and evidence could have
on appeal-or at least informing Vancleave that if he represented himself that he waived
any right to challenge the competency of counsel~the trial court simply informed
Vancleave that he could not advise Vancleave as to "whether appellate issues would be
[more] favorable by [his] personal representation or by [his] representation by counsel.
That's not for this court to determine" (R. 363 at 15). Vancleave asserts that potential
forfeiture of appellate claims because of ignorance of the law and/or rules of evidence
and procedure is an "actual risk" of self-representation to which he should have been
advised by the trial court.
Accordingly, Vancleave asserts that he did not voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly waive his right to counsel because of the trial court's failure to engage in a
sufficient on the record colloquy with Vancleave concerning "the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation" and because of the trial court's failure-at the very
least—to impart to him the seriousness of the charges, the possible maximum penalty
that could result from conviction, and the "actual risks" of proceeding pro se.
Vancleave further asserts that these constitutional infirmities require reversal of his
convictions.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the trial court failed to advise Vancleave of the "dangers and
disadvantages" of self-representation, failed to ensure that Vancleave understood the
seriousness of the charges against him and the possible maximum penalties, and failed
to ensure that Vancleave had an "actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se",
Vancleave asks that this Court reverse his convictions and hold that his waiver of the
trial counsel was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / / day of July, 2000.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Vancleave
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( 1]

Page 15

a matter of record.

(2]

MR. VANCLEAVE: At that time, your Honor,

[ 1]

trial, or in the alternative he will represent you, and

I

[2]

he will be the one that will be your advocate, speak in

I

[3]

first appearance, I asked the court to allow me my right

[3]

your behalf, make an opening statement in your behalf,

I

(4]

to a quick and - a speedy and public trial, which the

[4]

make closing arguments in your behalf, and conduct the

I

IB]

court did grant to me.

[5]

interrogation and cross-examination of witnesses. That

I

I 6]

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

[6]

is a critical issue before we proceed. And the defense

I

[7]

MR. VANCLEAVE: I provided the court also

[7]

may be heard relative to that issue.

I

18]

with a written - a handwritten demand for these charges

[8]

MR. VANCLEAVE Sir, I would like the

19]

to be expeditioned way back in the same month, which is

[9]

opportunity to - if I do represent myself, which I

1

(10]

April, your Honor. And I've been arguing the fact with

[10]

would like to do at this point, will that affect my

1

111]

the court ever since that my sixth amendment right is

[11]

appeal if this trial was to go against me?

112]

being violated here, sir, because the court grants me

[12]

(13]

the right to the speedy trial, but then takes numerous

[13]

may be so inept as it relates to knowledge of procedure.

114]

months to even get me into trial. And I've followed all

[14]

you may individually be very bright and able and

115]

the proper procedures in filing my disposition. I have

[15]

articulate and persuasive, and it may be in your best

1

(16]

a written motion here -

[16]

interests or it may not be in your best interests. 1

1
1

THE COURT: 1 cannot advise you of that

1
You

(17]

THE COURT: You will recall, Mr. Vancleave,

[17]

cannot advise you whether appellate issues would be

118]

that I asked you and requested specifically, rather than

[18]

favorable by your personal representation or by your

(19]

to have - because there are first degree felonies

[19]

representation by counsel. That's not for this court to

120]

involved and the complexities involved, I asked you to

[20]

determine. That's an individual choice.

121]

file motions in connection with appointed counsel so it

[21]

(22]

would resolve these very confusions. I suspect you'll

[22]

(23]

recall that

[23]

124]

wanted those filed by appointed legal counsel rather

[24]

represent yourself, you will represent yourself. You

1

126]

than sort of hen-scratched letters to the court, since

[25]

will be the only spokesman for the defense.

1

I wanted those to be in proper form, and I

Ml
(*)
[10
17]
1*)
l»l
moj

nn
|12]

myself, your Honor.

1

THE COURT: Very well.

If you choose to

Mr. Killpack will not have the opportunity then to cross

1

[2]

examine witnesses. He will not have the ability to call

1

[3]

witnesses. He will not have the ability to make opening

1

[4]

statements or closing arguments to this jury. But 1

1

with reasonable dispatch. And that is Mr. Killpack's

[5]

will give you leave, during the course of the trial,

1

position. We need to determine whether Mr. Vancleave is

[6]

when necessary, to consult with Nm on procedural

1

representing himself at this juncture or whether

[7]

matters and for clarification of matters and for the

1

Mr. Killpack is his counsel.

1

I'll tell you what I'm going to do. Does the
State MR. TAYLOR: 1 think what we ought to resolve

[8]

exhaustion of questions and cross-examination of

THE COURT: That's the next issue.

[9]

witnesses. He will be advisory and a consultant to you,

1

1 will reserve on the issue of the 120 day

[10]

and you may proceed to represent yourself.

1

disposition.

1 don't recommend that. I've told you at all

[11]

MR. VANCLEAVE

I would like to -

[12]

stages of this case that these are serious charges, and

[13]

that 1 think your case is best served by having a

court - and I will direct this, sir - is whether or

[14]

seasoned expert, a seasoned advocate, a seasoned

I I lb J

not you are representing yourself today with Stephen

[15]

attorney such as Mr. Killpack to be your advocate in

ma)

Killpack as advisory counsel, or whether he is the one

[16]

this case. That has been my recommendation at all

that is going to conduct this trial and represent you

[17]

stages.

11131
(14)

|17]

THE COURT: Now the next issue before the

1 don't depart from it now. But you have the

(18)

and be an advocate for you and speak in your behalf and

[18]

right to represent yourself.

(19)

have opening argument in your behalf and cross-examine

[19]

elect to do so, but under the conditions that 1 have

1*0)

witnesses in your behalf.

[20]

stated.

(2D

will allow you to make an election now, sir. You'll

[21]

either represent yourself with Mr. Killpack being

[22]

f*2)
11131

1

[ 1]

you had the benefit of appointed counsel.

(2]
13]

MR. VANCLEAVE: 1 would like to represent

Page 16

Page 14
1 D

1

I will not allow both. I

advisory counsel so you can ask Nm questions and ask

[23]

MR. VANCLEAVE

And to that extent you may

Okay.

THE COURT: Does either side wish to be heard
relative to that issue?

1
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 980210-CA

vs.
Priority No. 2

RODGER VANCLEAVE,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Vancleave knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to

counsel? This issue presents this Court with a question of law that is reviewed
"nondeferentially for correctness" with a "reasonable measure of discretion" afforded
the trial court when applying this legal question to a given set of facts. State v.
McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781 (Utah App. 1996). This issue was addressed in a pretrial letter and hearings and at trial (R. 38, 83-84, 360, 363 at 13-16).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Rodger VanCleave appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable Lynn W. Davis, after a jury trial at which VanCleave was convicted of the
following criminal offenses: Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory, a first degree
felony; Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second degree
felony; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; Loaded Firearm in a
Motor Vehicle, a class B misdemeanor; and Speeding, a class C misdemeanor.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Rodger Vancleave was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on

or about March 17, 1997, with: Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory, a first degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4, 5; Possession of a Precursor, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4, 5;1 Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503; Possession of Marijuana in a drug-free zone, a class
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l); Loaded Firearm in a Motor Vehicle, a class B

1

This charge was subsequently dismissed by Motion of the Utah County Attorney
because lab analysis revealed that the suspected substance was not ephedrine or any other
listed precursor chemical (R. 50-51).
2

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-505; and Speeding, a class
C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-46, 52 (R. 1-2).
On March 25, 1997, a search warrant was signed by the Honorable John C.
Backlund granting police permission to search the vehicle Vancleave was driving when
stopped (R. 5-8).
On April 21, 1997, a preliminary hearing wad conducted by the Honorable Guy
R. Burningham and Vancleave was bound-over on all charges and "not-guilty" pleas
were entered (R. 21-23).
On May 7, 1997, Vancleave, pro se, filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars (R.
39). On June 11, 1997, the UCPDA filed a similar request (R. 69-71). At a hearing
held on June 12, 1997, the State indicated that they filed a response to the request and
sent it to defense counsel (R. 360 at 10). However, at this time neither defense counsel
nor Vancleave had received a copy of the response (R. 360 at 10-11).
On May 9, 1997, Vancleave, pro se, filed a written demand for a jury trial and
for separate trials on each count of the information (R. 46). The trial court denied this
motion at the June 12, 1997, hearing (R. 360 at 28).
On June 11, 1997, Vancleave through the UCPDA filed a Motion to Suppress
evidence seized from Vancleave's vehicle at the time of his arrest under Article I, § 14
of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
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(R. 55-68). On July 1, 1997 (R. 361), a suppression hearing was held and Judge Davis
denied Vancleave's motion (R. 105-06, 114-20, 123-29).
On August 26-28, 1997. a jury trial was held with Judge Davis presiding (R.
193-202). After deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict of "guilty" on all charges
except the possession of marijuana charge (R. 191-92).
On November 10, 1997, Vancleave, pro se, filed a Motion for a New Trial (R.
227-34, 239-50, 251-59). At this time, Vancleave also filed a 402 motion (R. 235-38).
On November 10, 1997, Vancleave was sentenced to concurrent terms in the
Utah State Prison to run consecutive to the term he was currently serving (R. 268-70).
On December 30, 1997, a hearing on Vancleave's post-trial motions was held at
which time Judge Davis denied all motions (R. 320, 322-32).
On April 29, 1998, Vancleave filed a notice of appeal with the Fourth District
Court (R. 338-39). On or about August 11, 1998, the case was transferred from the
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 349).
Because the Sixth Amendment issue of counsel is of particular importance to this
appeal, Vancleave outlines the issue separately here:
1.

Representation

On May 7, 1997, Vancleave filed a letter with the trial court asking for the
appointment of new counsel because of a failure to communicate by the UCPDA (R. 38).
On June 12, 1997, a hearing was held where Vancleave again requested the appointment
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of new counsel (R. 83-84). At the hearing, Vancleave asserted that the Utah County
Public Defenders Association had rendered "insufficient assistance of counsel in this
matter," that he and the Public Defender (Steve Killpack) do not "see eye to eye", and
that he wanted counsel who was "willing to defend me in this case" (R. 360 at 6).
Vancleave further asserted that Killpack had failed to file motions on his behalf
and had failed to send him copies of motions and discovery requests (R. 360 at 7).
Judge Davis responded that Killpack "does not have to file motions in your behalf that he
believes may not be meritorious" and that Killpack was a "seasoned" attorney who had a
great deal of experience in criminal law (R. 360 at 7-8). However, the trial court
subsequently ordered defense counsel to provide Vancleave with a copy of the State's
response to the request for a Bill of Particulars when it was received (R. 360 at 11). In
addition, Killpack was ordered to provide Vancleave with copies of all written
responses filed by the State to all motions filed by Vancleave; and that Killpack and
Vancleave were to have consultation in respect to all received discovery (R. 360 at 15,
32).
Vancleave next asserted that there was a conflict of interest between himself and
Killpack (R. 360 at 8). Judge Davis then asked Vancleave about what his response
would be if new counsel believed that his requested motions were not meritorious and
Vancleave responded that he would "ask for different counsel" (R. 360 at 8). Judge
Davis then told Vancleave that appointed counsel was a "luxury" and that unless he can
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"show an actual conflict of interest" then he did not get to select the attorney who would
represent him (R. 360 at 8).
Vancleave again asserted that an actual conflict of interest did exist (R. 360 at 9).
Vancleave argued that Killpack "doesn't do anything I ask him to do", that he had only
had contact with Killpack twice since the previous court hearing and that he could not
prepare a defense with such minimal contact (Id.).
After hearing argument from the State, Judge Davis denied Vancleave's request
for new counsel (R. 360 at 10). At the close of the hearing, Vancleave requests that the
trial court order that defense counsel have personal communication with him concerning
motions and proper responses (R. 360 at 33). Vancleave also requested that the trial
court provide him with "some subpoena forms" because his counsel refused (R. 360 at
38). The trial court ordered Killpack to provide Vancleave with the forms, however, the
trial court clarified that Killpack would "conduct the trial and make a determination, after
consulting with [Vancleave], which witnesses would be appropriate to call or how they
may present any evidence" or testimony (R. 360 at 38).
In the future Vancleave was ordered to seek leave of court to file any pro se
motions; and he was to send a copy of any such motions to the State and to Killpack or
indicate to the court that it was to make the copies and forward them (R. 360 at 43).
On August 26, 1997, at the commencement of the jury trial, the issue of
representation was again raised. The trial court reminded Vancleave that he was facing
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first degree felonies with complex issues and that accordingly he had required that
Vancleave file all motions through appointed counsel (R. 363 at 13). The trial court,
upon the urging of the State, then asked Vancleave:
whether or not you are representing yourself today with Steven Killpack as
advisory counsel, or whether he is the one that is going to conduct this trial
and represent you and be an advocate for you and speak in your behalf and
cross-examine witnesses in your behalf
(R. 363 at 14). The trial court then required that Vancleave make an election between
self-representation (with advisory counsel) and representation by Killpack (Id.).
In response to this issue, Vancleave inquired of the trial court whether selfrepresentation would affect any necessary appeal (R. 363 at 15). The trial court
responded that he "cannot advise you whether appellate issues would be favorable by
your personal representation or by your representation by counsel" (R. 363 at 15).
Vancleave then indicated to the trial court that he wanted to represent himself (R.
363 at 15). The trial court responded to this request as follows:
Very well. If you choose to represent yourself, you will represent
yourself. You will be the only spokesman for the defense. Mr. Killpack
will not have the opportunity then to cross examine witnesses. He will not
have the ability to call witnesses. He will not have the ability to make
opening statements or closing arguments to the jury. But I will give you
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leave, during the course of the trial, when necessary, to consult with him on
procedural matters and for clarification of matters and for the exhaustion of
questions and cross-examination of witnesses. He will be advisory and a
consultant to you, and you may proceed to represent yourself.
I don't recommend that. I've told you at all stages of this case that
these are serious charges, and that I think your case is best served by having
a seasoned expert, a seasoned advocate, a seasoned attorney such as Mr.
Killpack to be your advocate in this case. That has been my
recommendation at all stages. I don't depart from it now. But you have the
right to represent yourself. And to that extent you may elect to do so, but
under the conditions that I have stated
(R. 363 at 15-16). Vancleave then responded "okay" and proceeded to represent himself
with Killpack acting as advisory counsel (R. 363 at 16). The trial court frequently
encouraged Vancleave to have Killpack represent him.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Testimony of Deputy David Knowles
David Knowles, a detective with the Utah County Sheriffs Department,

testified that on March 7, 1997, he was patrolling in the area of Spanish Fork
Canyon where the posted speed limit is 65 miles per hour (R. 363 at 81-82, 85-86).

While patrolling Knowles observed a white Buick headed westbound down the
canyon at the Diamond Fork turn-off that he believed was speeding (R. 363 at 8788). Knowles followed the vehicle in order to get a paced reading of speed before
initiating a stop of the vehicle for traveling 75 miles per hour (R. 363 at 88-89).
After the vehicle stopped-exactly 446 feet from the Covered Bridge
parking lot (R. 363 at 190-92), Knowles approached the driver, who was identified
as Rodger Vancleave from a New Mexico driver's license (R. 363 at 91, 93).
Knowles testified that he could smell the odor of marijuana emanating from the
passenger compartment of the vehicle (R. 363 at 93).
After running a warrants check on Vancleave, Knowles arrested Vancleave
because of two warrants and discovered from Vancleave that there was a firearm
underneath the front seat of the vehicle (R. 363 at 94, 121). Knowles checked the
vehicle and found an operable handgun that was fully loaded (R. 363 at 96, 97).
Knowles also found a small, burnt marijuana cigarette under the seat, some
ammunition and a broken vial on the floor, and some zig-zag papers on the front
seat (R. 363 at 101-103). Knowles testified that vial's like the one found broken in
the vehicle are commonly used to smoke methamphetamine (R. 363 at 104).
In a later search of the vehicle's trunk, Knowles located duffle bags shown
in a photograph of the trunk which was admitted as State's Exhibit #14 (R. 363 at
9

107). In the black duffel bag with the blue zipper (Exhibit #15), Knowles testified
that he observed some beakers, a funnel and a black stopper tube or plug, a
thermos and ajar containing clear liquid (R. 363 at 107). Knowles testified that
these items caused him concern because these items were consistent with the
manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 363 at 108). In the other bag (Exhibit #16),
Knowles testified that he observed a can of acetone and other glass items (R. 363
at 108). In a third bag (Exhibit #17), Knowles testified that he observed rubber
gloves, a partially-visible vacuum pump and some tubing—all items, which
according to Knowles, are commonly found in association with a
methamphetamine lab (R. 363 at 110). It is unclear from Knowles' testimony as to
which bags were partially opened in the trunk when he first observed them and
which bags he opened in his exploration (R. 364 at 59-). Knowles testified that he
also found a box containing books, letters and papers in the trunk (Exhibit #18).
Knowles testified that he was concerned that there might be "dangerous
chemicals" in the bags so he contacted Richard Case, a lab certified detective (R.
363 at 112).
During the search of the vehicle, Vancleave was seated in Knowles' patrol
car (R. 363 at 113). Afterwards Knowles testified that he read Vancleave his
Miranda rights and then questioned him about the methamphetamine lab (R. 363 at
10

113). Knowles testified that Vancleave informed him that he had used
methamphetamine before he left on his trip and that he was transporting the lab to
Ogden in exchange for $10,000 (R. 363 at 114).
Vancleave was later transported to the Utah County Jail and the vehicle was
driven to a vehicle storage facility at the old jail (R. 363 at 114). Knowles testified
that he turned all items of evidence over to Sergeant Case when he assumed his
duties as case officer (R. 364 at 23). Knowles testified that the duffel bags found
in the trunk of Vancleave's vehicle were "destroyed in accordance with policies
and procedures for crime labs" which is why the jury was presented only with
photographs of the bags (R. 364 at 57).
B.

Testimony of Deputy Richard Case
Richard Case of the Utah County Sheriffs Department testified that he has

been certified by the DEA in regards to clandestine laboratories (R. 364 at 11011). During this certification process, Case was taught how to identify,
disassemble and destroy such labs (R. 364 at 111). Case also testified that the
DEA has promulgated special policies and procedures as to the handling of lab
evidence (R. 364 at 112). When a discovery of a possible lab is made, Case
testified that he has been instructed to contact the State Lab Team from the Utah
Department of Investigations in order that certified personnel can respond to the
11

site to disassemble and destroy the lab (R. 364 at 112). Case testified that the lab
evidence is viewed and then destroyed because of "environmental hazards that the
items pose in themselves, along with the chemicals associated with the
manufacturing of illicit street drugs" (R. 364 at 113, 364 at 145-48).
Case testified that on March 7, 1997, he responded to the Utah County Jail
to an investigation regarding Vancleave (R. 364 at 113-14). Case testified that
immediately upon meeting Knowles at the the jail he recovered "all of the items
from the lab—the vehicle" and that later in the evening he picked up other itemssuch as the gun and holster-from Knowles' residence (R. 364 at 114-15).
Later Case searched the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant (R. 364 at
118). At trial, Case identified Exhibits 15-17 as photographs of the bags that were
turned over to him by Knowles and which had been in his vehicle (R. 364 at 119,
128). Case further indicated that the items in the bags were destroyed at the Utah
County Jail parking lot by the clandestine drug lab team (R. 364 at 134). Case
also testified that Exhibit 21 was the original evidence receipt and property report
that was provided by the State Lab Team when they disposed of "the lab" (R. 364
at 119). Case testified that he was present when the document was prepared and
that he observed as each of the items listed on the report was located from the
evidence—from the bags pictured in Exhibits 15-17 (R. 364 at 120). Case testified
12

that based on his experience, he observed items in the bag that could or would be
used to manufacture methamphetamine (R. 364 at 120). Case, likewise, testified
that those items were destroyed (R. 364 at 120).
Case testified that he spoke with Vancleave at the jail while he was seated in
the passenger seat of Deputy Buffon's patrol vehicle (R. 364 at 122). According to
Case, Vancleave told him that his fingerprints would not be on any of the seized
items, that he had been involved in a "meth cook" approximately four weeks (or
four months) prior to his arrest, and that he was transporting the lab from Texas to
Ogden(R. 364 at 122-124).
C.

Testimony of Sergeant Denton Johnson
Denton Johnson, a sergeant with the Orem Police Department, testified that,

pursuant to a search warrant, he performed a search of Vancleave's car at the
Pleasant Grove Police Department (R. 364 at 157-58). During the search, Johnson
testified that he found several items of drug paraphernalia (R. 364 at 158-63). In
addition, Johnson testified that he found correspondence addressed to Vancleave
and a "recipe" in the visor above the driver's seat (Exhibit 27) (R. 364 at 164,
191).
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D.

Testimony of Jennifer McNair
Jennifer McNair, an analyst of suspected controlled substances at the Utah

State Crime Laboratory, testified that she was familiar with equipment and
supplies—including recipes-used in the production of methamphetamine (R. 364
at 188). McNair testified that she has responded to the scene of approximately 40
clandestine methamphetamine labs (R. 364 at 188). McNair testified that she
examined the recipe found with the correspondence addressed to Vancleave
(Exhibit 27) and found it to be "very similar to a recipe I've used in the laboratory
to produce methamphetamine" (R. 364 at 191-92).
McNair also testified that Exhibit 21 is an evidence property report used by
the Utah Department of Investigations at clandestine laboratory scenes (R. 364 at
192). McNair testified that all equipment connected with suspected clandestine
-. laboratory sites are considered by policy to be hazardous, per se, and are therefore,
by policy, destroyed as soon as they are identified and noted (R. 364 at 193).
McNair testified that she examined the list (Exhibit 21)2 and that it includes
equipment which would be or could be used in the production of

2

During trial, the State and Vancleave stipulated that Vancleave's fingerprints would
not have been found on any of the items located in the bags in the trunk of the vehicle
driven by Vancleave and identified and listed in Exhibit 21 (R. 364 at 210).
14

methamphetamine and that the items inventoried there are consistent with what
could be found at a methamphetamine lab site (R. 364 at 193).
McNair testified that the three main chemicals used for the manufacture of
methamphetamine are ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, iodine and red phosphorous (R.
364 at 196).3 In order to make the form of methamphetamine that is most widely
used in Utah, all three chemicals must be present (R. 364 at 196-97).
McNair also analyzed the suspected marijuana cigarette (Exhibit 10) and
that it tested positive (R. 364 at 189-91). In addition to the cigarette, McNair
tested a powder substance from which no controlled substances were identified (R.
364 at 198-99). The substance was identified as "4-methyl-amino-phenol"-a
sumstance that McNair was unsure of whether it was hazardous or explosive (R.
364 at 200).
E.

Testimony of Mary Brockbader
Mary Brockbader, sergeant of records and identification for the Department

of Corrections, testified that she brought exhibits 19-20 to the trial court from the
Department of Corrections (R. 363 at 139-42). She also testified that she received

3

The State also stipulated that had all of the items seized from the vehicle been
tested, none of them would have tested positive for red phosphorous (R. 364 242).
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a demand for a 120-day disposition from Vancleave and that she is the authorized
records authority at the Utah State Prison (R. 363 at 144).
Brockbader further testified that on March 7, 1997, Vancleave was on
parole in the State of Utah (R. 364 at 90). In addition, Brockbader testified that on
one release date Vancleave was released to the State of New Mexico but that she
could find nothing in his file which refers to a "compact" to New Mexico (R. 364
at 95).
F.

Testimony of Rodger Vancleave
Vancleave testified that the vehicle he was driving at the time of his arrested

did not belong to him but was borrowed from a fellow New Mexico resident who
had been staying at his residence in Alamogordo (R. 364 at 265-66). Vancleave
testified that he did not have knowledge of what was inside the bags which were in
the vehicle when he borrowed the vehicle (R. 364 at 266). Vancleave also
testified that he did not know that there was a firearm in the vehicle until shortly
before his arrest (R. 364 at 267). In addition, Vancleave testified that he was no
longer on parole in New Mexico because it had been terminated (R. 364 at 267,
271). Finally, Vancleave testified that he did not have any intent to manufacture
any type of controlled substance (R. 364 at 268); and he denied ever admitting to
the police that he was transporting lab equipment to Ogden (R. 364 at 281).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to be represented by counsel and the right to self-representation if a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver is made of the right to counsel. For such a
waiver to be constitutionally permissible, the trial court must assure that the defendant
understands the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation". In accordance with
this duty, Utah appellate courts have instructed trial courts to engage in an on the
record colloquy in order to ascertain the validity of the waiver of counsel. At the very
least it must be apparent from the trial court record that the defendant understood the
seriousness of the charges against him, knew the maximum penalty, and had an actual
awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se. Vancleave asserts that the trial court did
not act in accordance with his duty to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is
in line with the requirements of Utah courts and the constitution. The trial court did
not engage in a sufficient colloquy with Vancleave. The trial court did not ensure that
Vancleave understood the seriousness of the charges against him nor that he knew the
naximum penalty he could face if convicted. In addition, the trial court did not assure
that Vancleave had an actual awareness of the risks of self-representation.
Accordingly, Vancleave requests that this Court reverse his conviction because his
waiver of the right to counsel was not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently made.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
VANCLEAVE'S WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT MADE
KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY OR INTELLIGENTLY
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
criminally accused the right to competent legal counsel and the right to selfrepresentation. McDonald, 922 P.2d at 778-79 (citations omitted). However, for a
defendant to constitutionally represent himself, he must knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily "forgo the benefits" associated with the right to counsel. Faretta v.
California, All U.S. 806, 832-33, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540 (1975); State v. Frampton, 737
P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987); McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779.
Moreover, while Vancleave has "the burden of showing by a preponderance of
evidence that he did not so waive this right", the trial court has the "duty to determine
whether a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent."
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 1 22-23, 979 P.2d 799, 810. Accordingly, Utah courts
have repeatedly recommended that the trial court conduct an on-the-record colloquy
with the accused in which "the court should fully inform the accused 'of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows
what he is doing and that his choice is made with eyes open.'" Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at
123, 922 P.2d at 810 (quoting and citing Frampton, 731 P.2d at 187). In addition, the
trial court "should also carefully evaluate the accused's background, experience, and
18

conduct insofar as they indicate what the accused understands in attempting to waive
the right to counsel. Bakalov 1999 UT 45 at 1 23.
As a guide to the trial courts, the Utah Supreme Court in Frampton cited, in its
entirety, the colloquy set forth in the Bench Book for United States District Court
Judges to be utilized when a defendant states a desire to represent himself. 737 P.2d at
187, n. 12. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court in Frampton stated that such "a colloquy
on the record between the court and the accused is the preferred method of ascertaining
the validity of a waiver because it insures that defendants understand the risks of selfrepresentation." 922 P.2d at 187.
In this case, the trial court did not engage in such a colloquy with Vancleave.
Although the issue of Vancleave's dissatisfaction with appointed counsel had been
addressed prior to trial (R. 38, 83-84, 360), the question of self-representation did not
become at issue until the morning of trial. On the morning of trial, the issue of
Vancleave's request for a 120-day disposition was again raised and Vancleave spoke
spoke of motions and a form that he had prepared and sent to the court and the State
(R. 363 at 9, 13). During this discussion, the trial court reminded Vancleave that he
was to file all motions through his counsel in order to avoid confusion because first
degree felonies are involved (R. 363 at 13). The State then suggested that the trial
court address the issue of representation and the following discussion ensued:
The trial court asked Vancleave:
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whether or not you are representing yourself today with Steven Killpack
as advisory counsel, or whether he is the one that is going to conduct this
trial and represent you and be an advocate for you and speak in your
behalf and cross-examine witnesses in your behalf
(R. 363 at 14). The trial court then required that Vancleave make an election between
self-representation (with advisory counsel) and representation by Killpack (Id.).
In response to this issue, Vancleave inquired of the trial court whether selfrepresentation would affect any appellate litigation that might prove necessary should
he be convicted (R. 363 at 15). The trial court responded that he could not "advise
[Vancleave] whether appellate issues would be favorable by [his] personal
representation or by [his] representation by counsel" (R. 363 at 15).
Vancleave then indicated to the trial court that he wanted to represent himself
(R. 363 at 15). The trial court responded to this request as follows:
Very well. If you choose to represent yourself, you will represent
yourself. You will be the only spokesman for the defense. Mr. Killpack
will not have the opportunity then to cross examine witnesses. He will
not have the ability to call witnesses. He will not have the ability to make
opening statements or closing arguments to the jury. But I will give you
leave, during the course of the trial, when necessary, to consult with him
on procedural matters and for clarification of matters and for the
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exhaustion of questions and cross-examination of witnesses. He will be
advisory and a consultant to you, and you may proceed to represent
yourself.
I don't recommend that. I've told you at all stages of this case that
these are serious charges, and that I think your case is best served by
having a seasoned expert, a seasoned advocate, a seasoned attorney such
as Mr. Killpack to be your advocate in this case. That has been my
recommendation at all stages. I don't depart from it now. But you have
the right to represent yourself. And to that extent you may elect to do so,
but under the conditions that I have stated
(R. 363 at 15-16). Vancleave then responded "okay" (R. 363 at 16) and proceeded to
represent himself with Killpack acting as advisory counsel.
Although the trial court during the course of the trial encouraged Vancleave to
allow Killpack to represent him and imparted to him the wisdom of such a decision, the
trial court never engaged in a colloquy on the record with Vancleave that is similar to
that set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Frampton. For example, the trial court did
not ascertain whether Vancleave had studied law in the past or represented himself in
any other criminal action. The trial court did not enquire whether Vancleave was
familiar with the Rules of Evidence or Criminal Procedure. In addition, the trial court
did not set forth the crimes of which Vancleave was charged (although he did allude to

21

first degree felonies) nor did the trial court set forth the potential penalties that could
result from conviction. Finally, the trial court did not inquire as to the voluntariness of
Vancleave's decision. See, Frampton, 131 P.2d at n.12. Cf., Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at
\ 23-26 (Trial court attempted several times to engage in Frampton colloquy with
defendant before finally engaging in successful colloquy; McDonald, 922 P.2d at 782
(Court inquired cf defendant number of trials he had been involved in, whether he had
knowledge of rules of evidence, what education he had, and whether he understood the
seriousness of the charges).
While the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the failure to conduct such a
colloquy would not warrant automatic reversal and that the Court would "look at any
evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of
proceeding pro se." the Court also stated that u[i]n the absence of a colloquy, the
record must somehow otherwise show that the defendant understood the seriousness of
the charges and knew the possible maximum penalty." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188.
Vancleave asserts that the trial court failed to inform him of the possible maximum
penalty during their discussion on the issue of self-representation. Moreover, other
than a vague reference to "first degree felonies" the trial court did not impart the
seriousness of the charges to Vancleave.
Finally, Vancleave asserts that he was not advised by the trial court of the
"actual risks of proceeding pro se." In fact, Vancleave sought to ascertain these actual
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risks of self-representation when he inquired as to what affect self-representation would
have on his ability to appeal any conviction (R. 363 at 15). However, instead of
educating Vancleave on the appellate rules concerning adequate preservation of issues
and the effect tha: ignorance of the law and rules of procedure and evidence could have
on appeal-or at least informing Vancleave that if he represented himself that he waived
any right to challenge the competency of counsel-the trial court simply informed
Vancleave that he could not advise Vancleave as to "whether appellate issues would be
[more] favorable by [his] personal representation or by [his] representation by counsel.
That's not for this court to determine" (R. 363 at 15). Vancleave asserts that potential
forfeiture of appellate claims because of ignorance of the law and/or rules of evidence
and procedure is an "actual risk" of self-representation to which he should have been
advised by the trial court.
According!;/, Vancleave asserts that he did not voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly waive his right to counsel because of the trial court's failure to engage in a
sufficient on the record colloquy with Vancleave concerning "the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation" and because of the trial court's failure-at the very
least—to impart v: him the seriousness of the charges, the possible maximum penalty
that could result Vom conviction, and the "actual risks" of proceeding pro se.
Vancleave furthe asserts that these constitutional infirmities require reversal of his
convictions.
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: INCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because rl e trial court failed to advise Vancleave of the "dangers and
disadvantages" o self-representation, failed to ensure that Vancleave understood the
seriousness of tlv charges against him and the possible maximum penalties, and failed
to ensure that Vancleave had an "actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se",
Vancleave asks that this Court reverse his convictions and hold that his waiver of the
trial counsel wa^ rot knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / / day of July, 2000.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Vancleave
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I { 1]

Page 15

a matter of record.

( 2]

MR. VANCLEAVE: At that time, your Honor.

[ 1]

trial, or in the alternative he will represent you, and

[ 2]

he will be the one that will be your advocate, speak in

[ 3]

first appearance. I asked the court to allow me my right

[3]

your behalf, make an opening statement in your behalf,

(4]

to a quick and - a speedy and public trial, which the

[ 4]

make closing arguments in your behalf, and conduct the

{ 5]

court did grant to me.

( 6]
! ( 7]

[ 5]

interrogation and cross-examination of witnesses. That

THE COURT: Yes. sir.

[6]

is a critical issue before we proceed. And the defense

MR. VANCLEAVE: I provided the court also

[ 7]

may be heard relative to that issue.

I ( 8]

with a written - a handwritten demand for these charges

[ 8]

{9]

to be expeditioned way back in the same month, which is

[ 9]

opportunity to - if I do represent myself, which I

(10]

April, your Honor. And I've been arguing the fact with

[10]

would like to do at this point, will that affect my

! {11]

the court ever since that my sixth amendment right is

[11]

appeal if this trial was to go against me?

(12]

being violated here. sir. because the court grants me

[12]

(13]

the right to the speedy trial, but then takes numerous

[13]

may be so inept as it relates to knowledge of procedure,

114]

months to even get me into trial. And I've followed all

[14]

you may individually be very bright and able and

I (15]

the proper procedures in filing my disposition. I have

[15]

articulate and persuasive, and it may be in your best

I (16]

a written motion here -

MR. VANCLEAVE: Sir, I would like the

THE COURT: I cannot advise you of that. You

[16]

interests or it may not be in your best interests. I

117]

THE COURT: You will recall, Mr. Vancleave.

[17]

cannot advise you whether appellate issues would be

(16]

that I asked you and requested specifically, rather than

[18]

favorable by your personal representation or by your

to have - because there are first degree felonies

[19]

representation by counsel. That's not for this court to

involved and the complexities involved, I asked you to

[20]

determine. That's an individual choice.

I (19]
(20]
I (21]

file

motions in connection with appointed counsel so it

[21]

(22]

would resolve these very confusions. I suspect you'll

[22]

(23]

MR. VANCLEAVE: I would like to represent
myself, your Honor.

recall that I wanted those to be in proper form, and I

[23]

THE COURT: Very well. If you choose to

I (24]

wanted those filed by appointed legal counsel rather

[24]

represent yourself, you will represent yourself. You

! (26]

than sort of hen-scratched letters to the court, since

[25]

will be the only spokesman for the defense.

Page 16

Page 14
| ( 1]

you had the benefit of appointed counsel.

J { 2]
| 3]

I'll tell you what I'm going to do. Does the
State -

j ( 4]

Mr. Kiiipack will not have the opportunity then to cross
examine witnesses. He will not have the ability to call

[ 3]

witnesses. He will not have the ability to make opening

[ 4]

statements or closing arguments to this jury. But I

with reasonable dispatch. And that is Mr. Killpack's

[ 5]

will give you leave, during the course of the trial.

11 6)

position. We need to determine whether Mr. Vancleave is

[6]

when necessary, to consult with him on procedural

I ( 7]

representing himself at this juncture or whether

[ 7]

matters and for clarification of matters and for the

I ( 8)

Mr. Kiiipack is Ns counsel.

[ 8]

exhaustion of questions and cross-examination of

I(

fe)

THE COURT: That's the next issue,

[ 9]

witnesses. He will be advisory and a consultant to you,

I will reserve on the issue of the 120 day

[10]

and you may proceed to represent yourself.

(6]

j 110)
|(11]
(121
1113]

MR. TAYLOR: I think what we ought to resolve

[ 1]
[ 2]

disposition.
MR. VANCLEAVE I would like to ~

I don't recommend that. I've told you at all

[12]

stages of this case that these are serious charges, and

[13]

that I think your case is best served by having a

court - and I will direct this, sir - is whether or

[14]

seasoned expert, a seasoned advocate, a seasoned

not you are representing yourself today with Stephen

[15]

attorney such as Mr. Kiiipack to be your advocate in

I (16)

Kiiipack as advisory counsel, or whether he is the one

[16]

this case. That has been my recommendation at all

1(17)

that is going to conduct this trial and represent you

[17]

stages. I don't depart from it now. But you have the

i f 18]

and be an advocate for you and speak in your behalf and

[18]

I (19]

have opening argument in your behalf and cross-examine

[19]

elect to do so, but under the conditions that I have

($0)

witnesses in your behalf. I will not allow both. I

[20]

stated.

|21]

will allow you to make an election now, sir. You'll

[21]

MR. VANCLEAVE Okay.

either represent yourself with Mr. Kiiipack being

[22]

THE COURT: Does either side wish to be he*

J14)
I |1fe)

[ (12)

THE COURT: Now the next issue before the

[11]

' ^—* ~~«H"Ksai so vou can ask him questions and ask

[23]

right

to represent yourself. And to that extent you may

relative to that issue?
MR TAYLOR: No.

